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The Story of Henry Adams's Soul:
Education and the Expression of Associations
Richard W. Garnettt
In several cases handed down during the headline-
grabbing October Term 1999,1 the United States Supreme
Court examined and re-committed itself to the freedom of asso-
ciation.2 Freedom of association-or, more particularly, of "ex-
pressive association"3-is, of course, a "roomy" notion.4 And
there is a real danger that the idea's pleasant connotations, un-
certain content, and hazy boundaries invite so much conceptual
clutter that the "room" can quickly become a storage closet,
whose door is best left shut so as to conceal the mess.5 Still, the
t Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Thanks are due
to Anthony J. Bellia, Nicole Stelle Garnett, Steffen Johnson, William K. Kel-
ley, John Copeland Nagle, Steven Smith, and Eugene Volokh for their com-
ments and criticism, to Fred Marczyk for his usual helpful research work, and
to the editors and staff-particularly Katherine Moerke, David Selden, Mi-
chael Skoglund, and Monica Payne-of the Minnesota Law Review for their
assistance and patience.
1. The 1999 Term was, everyone agrees, a blockbuster. See, e.g., Kath-
leen Sullivan, A Court Not Easy to Classify, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A31;
Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, An Explosive Year at the High Court, LEGAL
TIMEs, July 3, 2000, at 12.
2. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000); Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 120 S.
Ct. 1346 (2000). On the "freedom of association," see, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) ("The Constitution guarantees freedom of asso-
ciation... as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liber-
ties."); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment...."). See generally CHARLES E. RICE, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION (1962); M. GLENN ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND
ASSOCIATION (2d ed. 1981).
3. See, e.g., Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451.
4. I owe this adjective to Professor Adam Samaha of the University of
Minnesota Law School.
5. Cf Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2477 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the majority opinion's "expressive association" analysis is "merely conclu-
sory words, barren of analysis" (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 721
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))).
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basic ideas seem clear enough: we express and endorse ideas by
and through associating with others; associations, in turn,
transmit values and loyalties to us, and mediate between per-
sons and the state; and the First Amendment denies to gov-
ernment any right or power to standardize belief or impose or-
thodoxy by commandeering such expression or transmission.
By returning over and again to these fundamental points
in its recent decisions, the Court protected religious and ex-
pressive freedom in a manner true to the principle of subsidiar-
ity, the "principle of limited government" according to which
"[t]he state should do only what cannot effectively be done by
private action, and whenever possible the individual should
make his own decisions."6 Not surprisingly, some of these ex-
pressive-association rulings were controversial, and their im-
plications remain unclear.
The point of this Essay is to highlight a sometimes-
overlooked feature of the freedom of expressive association. It
turns out that there are (at least) two, and not only one, ex-
pressive-association "stories": one is the account of how we ex-
press ourselves and shape our world by and through our asso-
ciations with others; the other is about how we are spoken to,
and how our character and values are formed by, those associa-
tions. Toward this end, this Essay examines two other recent
and high-profile cases-Mitchell v. Helms7 and Troxel v. Gran-
6. David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 359, 359 & n.1 (1998).
"In the American context," Currie adds, subsidiarity "means that the federal
government should not do what the states can adequately do for themselves."
Id. The principle of subsidiarity also plays a central role in Twentieth Cen-
tury Catholic social thought and has been explained by Pope John Paul II as
the principle according to which
a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life
of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions,
but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its
activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to
the common good.
Pope John Paul II, Centissimus annus [Encyclical Letter On the Hundredth
Anniversary of Rerum novarum] 48 (May 1, 1991), available at
http://www.newadvent.org/docs/ip02ca.htm; see also, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon,
Civil Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1996, at 39, 40 ("Subsidiarity [is] the
principle of leaving social tasks to the smallest social unit that can perform
them adequately.") (reviewing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCON-
TENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996)). 'Subsidiarity" is
also an important concept in the law of the European Community. See gener-
ally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994).
7. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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ville8-in light of themes gleaned from last Term's expressive-
association opinions. Granted, freedom-of-association ques-
tions were neither raised nor resolved in these two cases:9
Mitchell was yet another parochial-school-aid case of the "films
good, projectors bad" variety,10 and Troxel involved parents'
substantive-due-process objections to one State's unusually ex-
pansive and intrusive third-party-visitation law. That said, we
will see that there are provocative thematic connections, if not
tight doctrinal links, between the expressive-association cases,
on the one hand, and the religion-, education-, and family-
related matters addressed in Mitchell and Troxel, on the other.
The hope is that identifying these connections will contribute to
the contemporary debate over the purpose, content, and control
of education in the liberal state, and also highlight the struc-
tural and educational functions of intermediate institutions-
"neighborhood, family, church and voluntary associations"" -
and of their expression.
Part I is a short reflection on education, prompted by The
Education of Henry Adams.12 "Education" sometimes seems lit-
tle more than a focus-group buzzword, an "issue" that any sen-
sible politico will include in his litany of priorities. The point of
this first Part, though, is that education is best thought of as a
process of formation, not merely of data delivery. This is why
the liberal state and the intermediate associations of civil soci-
ety will often-though, we should hope, not always-compete
8. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion).
9. At least, not explicitly. I co-wrote an amicus curiae brief filed in
Troxel by the Christian Legal Society and others that framed the questions
presented in expressive-association terms. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2075 n.2
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that freedom-of-association and free-exercise-of-
religion claims were not before the Court).
10. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that, under Meek and Wolman, "a State
may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps
of the United States, but... may not lend maps of the United States for use in
geography class").
11. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE:
THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1977). There is, of
course, a huge and exploding literature on voluntary associations-the "little
platoons" of democracy-and their place in civil society. The best place to
start is ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 489-99 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000).
12. THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Mod. Libr.
ed., 1996) [hereinafter EDUCATION].
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for the opportunity to educate, and thereby to impart loyalties,
inculcate values, and shape character.
13
Next, Part II offers some thoughts on the freedom of asso-
ciation and, more specifically, on the freedom of associations. It
suggests that we focus on associations themselves, and on the
content and function of their expression, no less than individu-
als' expressive acts of associating. Accordingly, this Part exam-
ines briefly the structural and educational roles of the institu-
tions and associations that shape personalities as they mediate
between persons and the state.
Part III then discusses three cases-Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale,14 California Democratic Party v. Jones,15 and Board of
Regents v. Southworth'6-that are the Court's latest contribu-
tions to our continuing effort'to sort out the constitutional and
moral relationships among government, schools, parents, and
children; and among the state, associations, and persons. It
has been observed that "contemporary constitutional doctrine
gives 'civil society' a relatively small protected domain,"17 but
this Part aims to highlight the recent expressive-association
cases' healthy respect for the dignity of families, churches, and
other subsidiary associations, a respect that, in turn, implies
meaningful limits on the state's own educational ambitions.
Finally, and against a backdrop of themes culled from
these three cases, Part IV examines and evaluates the Mitchell
and Troxel decisions. In Mitchell, a plurality of the Justices
disavowed the Court's longstanding suspicion toward one par-
ticular kind of intermediate association-Catholic schools-and
toward those associations' distinctive expression and mission.
13. In his Massey Lectures, Professor Carter discusses the demands of
"loyalty" made by mediating associations-religious communities, in particu-
lar-and how education instills such loyalty. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DIs-
SENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY
(1998); see, e.g., id. at 27 (noting the "potentially subversive" nature of reli-
gious communities, "for the meanings that they discover and assign to the
world may be radically distinct from those that are assigned by the political
sovereign"); id. at 29-30 ("[Rleligions ... demand forms of allegiance and thus
of loyalty."); id. at 79 (referring to the state's "competing instruction").
14. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
15. 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
16. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
17. Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 379, 412 (2000) (emphasis omitted). Tocqueville noted, though, that
"[tihere is only one nation on earth where [the citizens enjoy] unlimited free-




And in Troxel, the Court re-affirmed both the constitutional
limits on the child-shaping prerogatives of government func-
tionaries and the structural and moral priority of families. As
these two cases illustrate, families and schools, no less than
clubs, unions, and political parties, are mediating institutions
that form, shape, and educate us by their expression. Thus, we
see the importance of protecting not only individuals' freedom
of expressive association, but also the freedom of associations
and their expression, from undue state supervision and revi-
sion.
I. ASSOCIATIONS AND THE STORY OF
HENRY ADAMS'S SOUL
The Education of Henry Adams opens with the author's
late-in-life reflections on how his extraordinary career and
character were shaped, almost irresistibly, by a "nest of asso-
ciations'--by First Church, the State House, Beacon Hill, Har-
vard College, and so on.18 It is clear from the outset that The
Education is more than the story of how information and tech-
nique were transmitted to a well-born Nineteenth Century Bos-
ton youth.19 Nor is the book an account of how Adams was
groomed for good citizenship and public service in the early
Common Schools. Although he duly notes the enthusiasm of
his class for those purported seedbeds of democratic virtues,
20
Adams confesses his own heretical suspicion of government
schools, insisting, "All State education is a sort of dynamo ma-
chine for polarizing the popular mind; for turning and holding
its lines of force in the direction supposed to be the most effec-
tive for State purposes."2'
18. EDUCATION, supra note 12, at 3.
19. Indeed, Adams dismisses early on his "schoolmaster" as "a man em-
ployed to tell lies to little boys." Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 33 ("Social perfection was ... sure, because human nature
worked for Good, and three instruments were all she asked-Suffrage, Com-
mon Schools, and Press. On these points, doubt was forbidden."); see also, e.g.,
CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 76 (1983) (describing the "ideology" of the common
schools as "republicanism, Protestantism, and capitalism"). For more on the
ideology of the common-school movement, see generally CHARLES LESLIE
GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); LLOYD P.
JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL 1825-1925 (1987); JO-
SEPH P. VITERiTrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITU-
TION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 145-79 (1999).
21. EDUCATION, supra note 12, at 78; cf Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (noting that the objective of public education is
184520011
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Adams is refreshingly free, as he wanders Zelig-like
through the late Nineteenth Century in search of "education,"
of any illusions that he is a self-made man. Instead, The Edu-
cation of Henry Adams is his exploration of the "nest of associa-
tions" that has made him what he is. "Education" turns out to
be, for Adams, merely a convenient shorthand for the gradual
and imperceptible shaping of personality, the construction of
character, and the formation of-in today's jargon-"identity."22
It is the indivisible process of acquiring beliefs, premises, and
dispositions that are our windows on the world, that mediate
and filter our experience of it, and that govern our evaluation
and judgment of it. Education is what attaches us to those
goods and ends that attract, almost gravitationally, our deci-
sions and actions. In other words, although it would likely be-
muse the famously post-religious Adams to hear it, his Educa-
tion is really the "story of a soul. 2 3
Of course, it is precisely because education is the process
and craft of soul-making, and is as much about transmitting
values and loyalties to our children as it is about outfitting
them with useful data and "skill sets," that we care, argue, and
even fight so much about it. We care about education not just
because we think it matters what facts and figures our children
and our fellow citizens know. We care because, we think, it
matters what they value, it matters what-and in what-they
believe, and it matters to and for what they aspire.
Consider Wisconsin v. Yoder:24 the Old Order Amish who in
that case challenged their State's compulsory-school-
attendance laws, and who insisted on their own right and duty
to educate their children, did not want their children merely to
absorb the mechanics of low-technology farming and traditional
carpentry. Their real concern was that their children encoun-
the inculcation of "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a de-
mocratic political system'" (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77
(1979)); CARTER, supra note 13, at 41 ("From the earliest times, public educa-
tion in America has been understood, first and foremost, as training for citi-
zenship."); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST ix (2000) ("Public
schools are instruments for the most basic and controversial of civic ends[,] ...
[tihe project of creating citizens.").
22. See Edmund Morris, Introduction to EDUCATION, supra note 12, at viii
(noting that Adams's story describes "his whole evolution as a human being");
cf Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
635 (1980) ("[Olne's intimate associations ... have a great deal to do with the
formation and shaping of an individual's sense of his own identity.").
23. SAINT THERESE OF LISiEUX, THE STORY OF A SOUL (Tan ed. 1997).
24. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1846 [Vol. 85:1841
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ter and embrace the religious faith and the vocation to simplic-
ity that give meaning to these mechanics and traditions.25 The
community saw itself in the arena of education engaged in a
soul-making competition with government, and saw their tradi-.
tions and the state's ambitions as rival claimants for the loyalty
of their children. And they were right.
26
Here is another example: fifty years before Yoder, Oregon
made it a crime to send one's children to Catholic and other
private schools. 27 Charitably interpreted, the motives behind
this move were complex. 28 Most would agree, though, that its
supporters were worried less that Catholic schools were failing
to teach reading, math, or even good manners, and more that
these schools were expressing the un-American teachings of the
Roman Catholic Church.29 The law's defenders knew full
well-perhaps they'd read Henry Adams-that education
transmits more than information. They saw schooling as a
chance to gain an edge in the competition with parents' super-
stitions and authoritarian religion for the allegiance of chil-
dren.30 But in striking down the law as an unconstitutional in-
25. Cf The World Synod of Catholic Bishops, Justice in the World 51
(1971), available at http'//www.osjspm.org/cstjw.htm (noting that one purpose
of education is to "inculcate a truly and entirely human way of life in justice,
love and simplicity").
26. See CARTER, supra note 13, at 35 ("[A] religious community's efforts to
transmit its understandings of the world over time-to ensure the survival of
its narrative-will often be most vital, and also most at risk, in the education
of the community's children.").
27. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530-31 (1925).
28. Compare VITERITTI, supra note 20, at 154-55 (noting that the Act "was
cooked up in a campaign organized by the Ku Klux Klan and the Scottish Rite
Masons"), with MACEDO, supra note 21, at 99 ("We should... also take ac-
count of legitimate considerations advanced on behalf of the Oregon law, for it
was not simply motivated by anti-Catholic prejudice."). For a detailed and en-
gaging account of the compulsory-education movement, the extent to which it
was animated by nativism and anti-Catholicism, and the Supreme Court's re-
sponse in Pierce, see WILLIAM G. Ross, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM,
EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927 (1994).
29. See Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70
Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1203 (1997) ("[Pierce] must be un-
derstood in a historical context in which the Justices knew as well as anybody
that the Oregon law was, in large part, an effort to destroy Roman Catholi-
cism."); Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously:. The Family, Religious
Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 109, 123-24 (2000)
("Oregon's law appears to have been motivated less by a desire to, say, do right
by poor children... than by a fear that Catholic schools would do wrong to
them.").
30. In a similar vein, fifty years earlier, Harper's Weekly warned that "the
primary object of the Roman party is not the education of the children, but the
2001] 1847
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vasion of parents' fundamental freedoms, the United States
Supreme Court made it clear in Pierce v. Society of Sisters that,
in this competition anyway, our Constitution guarantees "the
liberty of parents... to direct the upbringing and education of
children."
31
Returning to the present, it is fair to say that, generally
speaking, the arguments of contemporary liberal theorists for
increased supervision by government of religious and private
schools are often less about the technical skills these schools do
or do not provide to their students than the extent to which
they fail to transmit the values, habits, and attitudes thought
necessary for meaningful life in and service to the liberal
state.32 After all, the argument goes, the state can no more
perpetuate itself without attending carefully to the dispositions
of its citizens, than a religious community that does not evan-
gelize each new generation can hope to thrive and survive. 33 In
Horace Mann's words, "[It may be an easy thing to make a re-
public; but it is a very laborious thing to make Republicans"
34
or, indeed, to make faithful Old Order Amish.35 This "laborious
thing" is what Adams would call "education."
maintenance and extension of the Roman Sect. The plan is to make the
schools nurseries of Roman Catholicism-a plan which every good citizen
should strenuously oppose." The Parochial Schools, HARPER'S WKLY., Apr. 10,
1875, at 294.
31. 268 U.S. at 534-35 (1925) (emphasis added); see also Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
32. See generally MACEDO, supra note 21; Amy Gutmann, Religious Free-
dom and Civic Responsibility, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 891 (1999); Stephen
Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Or-
ganizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000)
[hereinafter Macedo, Constituting Civil Society]. For the different argument
that many religious schools harm children by failing to equip them with the
critical-thinking skills, moral flexibility, and self-esteem they need to flourish,
see JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998).
33. William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political
Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 869, 870
(1999) ("Liberal democratic citizens are made, not born.... ."); AMY GUTMANN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 39, 42 (1987) ("We are committed to collectively re-
creating the society that we share .... The substance of this core commitment
is conscious social reproduction."); GEORGE WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT
90-91 (1983) ("[Mien and women are biological facts, but.., ladies and gen-
tlemen fit for self-government are social artifacts, creations of the law.").
34. CARTER, supra note 13, at 45 (quoting Horace Mann, The Importance
of Universal, Free, Public Education).
35. Chief Justice Burger observed as much in Yoder: "[C]ompulsory school
attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real threat of
undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today;
they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be
1848 [Vol. 85:1841
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II. WHAT ARE ASSOCIATIONS FOR?36
Like Henry Adams, we are all educated in and by a "nest of
associations." Granted, we cannot all have two Presidents in
our immediate family. Still, like Adams, we are who we are,
and flourish to the extent that we do, because of the associa-
tions in which we're "nested" and by which we're educated.
37
And notice that these soul-making associations are not simply
vehicles for self-actualizing choices by autonomous monads.
38
They might be that, too, but they are more than just that. That
is, while it is true that we speak and express ourselves through
associations, we are also spoken to and formed by them and by
their expression.39 We should therefore attend not only to the
ways that government, by regulating associations' activities,
burdens the expression of individuals. We should also think
and worry-as both The Education of Henry Adams and the
Court's recent expressive-association cases invite us to do
4 0-
forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region." 406 U.S. at 218.
Justice Douglas's concern, on the other hand, was that "[ilf a parent keeps his
child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever
barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have
today.... If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over
him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and de-
formed." Id. at 245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. Cf. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996).
37. Cf. Macedo, Constituting Civil Society, supra note 32, at 428 ("[N]o one
affiliation or set of affiliations [should] provideI] an unproblematic or simple
answer to the question 'who am I?-).
38. Cf First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting) ("[Tihere are some corporations formed for the express
purpose of advancing certain ideological causes shared by all their mem-
bers .... Under such circumstances, association in a corporate form may be
viewed as merely a means of achieving effective self-expression.").
39. Professor Fort has explored this point. See Timothy L. Fort & Cindy
A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global Environment: The Search for
the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 860 (2000) ("Within
[mediating institutions] human beings obtain their moral knowledge and per-
sonal identity .... The individual's conscience is thereby formed, and the
community provides a monitoring and nurturing function for moral behav-
ior."); Timothy L. Fort, The First Man and the Company Man: The Common
Good, Transcendence, and Mediating Institutions, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 430
(1999) ("[Mlediating institutions transform members and define their priori-
ties."); Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits
"Just Right,- 23 J. CORP. L. 245, 264 (1998) (observing that associations "form
the moral identity of individuals").
40. See The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 179, 262 (2000) (noting that the question presented in Dale is best
framed as "whether the government may commandeer [the Boy Scouts'] ex-
pressive facilities as passive conduits for an ideological message the organiza-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1841
about whether and how government supervision of associations'
expression threatens, crowds out, and commandeers their edu-
cational, soul-making role.41
There is, of course, weighty precedent for this approach. It
was, after all, our dense web of voluntary associations, no less
than our individualism, that most captured Tocqueville's atten-
tion:
Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly [form asso-
ciations]. Not only do they have commercial and industrial associa-
tions in which all take part, but they also have a thousand other
kinds: religious, moral, grave, futile, very general and very particular,
immense and very small .... 42
But the question remains: do our undoubted associational dis-
positions tell us anything about the protections the Constitu-
tion provides to associations' expression?
The First Amendment does not, by its terms, confer or pro-
tect a right of association--expressive, commercial, intimate, or
otherwise.43 Still, it has long been "beyond debate that the
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which em-
braces freedom of speech."" Put in a slightly different way, the
tion finds objectionable").
41. See GEORGE F. WILL, THE WOVEN FIGURE: CONSERVATIVISM AND
AMERICA'S FABRIC, 1994-1997, at 103 (1997) ("Society is a crucible of character
formation. Human beings are political, meaning social, beings, fulfilled in as-
sociations. Government can damage associational life, and big government
can do big damage.").
42. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 489. Over a century later, one
scholar remarked,
The American people are chronic joiners. They join churches, garden
clubs, literary societies, reform leagues, political parties, unions, so-
cial clubs, and secret lodges .... If all the knights of various degrees
and fealties in the United States were to sally forth to do battle in a
modern religious war, the earlier Crusades by comparison would have
been minor skirmishes.
ABERNATHY, supra note 2, at 171.
43. The First Amendment does protect "the right of the people peaceably
to assemble," U.S. CONST., amend. I, and it has been suggested that "Itihe
right of association is simply the modern-day manifestation of the right to as-
sembly," David Cole, Hanging With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists,
and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 228.
44. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). As one commentator
put it,
Nowhere in the Constitution is freedom of association, or the right to
associate, mentioned. But, as the language of the court [in NAACP v.
Alabama] implies, freedom of association is nothing new. The right to
associate for the advancement of ideas has been recognized implicitly
1850
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"right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of po-
litical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends" has been said to "correspond" to, and be "implicit in," the
right "to engage in activities protected by the First Amend-
ment."45
This freedom of expressive association has several modes;
it can be and is exercised in a number of ways. For example,
the simple act of associating can itself be a form of expression.
We often join clubs, affiliate with parties, donate to organiza-
tions, and even subscribe to magazines, simply to say some-
thing.46 We might not believe or even care whether our expres-
sive act of association will somehow, further down the line,
amplify or increase the purchase of our views.47 In fact, our
purpose might not be to call others' attention to those views or
values at all, but simply to confirm to ourselves that we hold
them. In any event, it is the act of associating that is the
in the past, and it has underlain important decisions which have been
formally ascribed to the application of other freedoms.
RICE, supra note 2, at xvii-xviii; see also ABERNATHY, supra note 2, at 173
("Neither in the United States Constitution nor in the constitutions of the
various states is there a specific statement of the right of association. Logi-
cally, however, it is clearly a right cognate to the right of assembly.").
45. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); see also Cal. Democ-
ratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2408 (2000) (noting the "fxeedom to join
together in furtherance of common political beliefs" (citation omitted)); Dale,
120 S. Ct. at 2451.
That it is instrumental, though, does not mean the freedom of association
is less than fundamental. As Tocqueville observed,
After the freedom to act alone, the most natural to man is that of
combining his efforts with the efforts of those like him and acting in
common. The right of association therefore appears to me to be al-
most as inalienable in its nature as [the right of personal liberty].
The legislator cannot wish to destroy it without attacking society it-
self.
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 184; see also Pope Leo XII, Rerum novarum
[Encyclical Letter On the Condition of the Working Classes] 72 (1891), avail-
able at http'/Iistserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/leo.xiii/rerum.nova
rum.html ("[Mian is permitted by a right of nature to form private socie-
ties .... [Mien are by nature inclined to associate."); id. 73 ("[Associations
are] formed in accordance with natural right.").
46. For example, people often proclaim proudly that they are "card-
carrying members of the ACLU."
47. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam) ("A contribu-
tion serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his
views .... The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase
perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely
on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.").
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statement-like wearing a button or putting a bumper sticker
on a car-and that says by itself all we need and mean to say.
Sometimes, though, we affiliate with others in order to
amplify, coordinate, and therefore make more effective the ex-
pression of our views. We associate not just to make a state-
ment, but to get something done. True, we might join the
AARP purely to express to the world solidarity with our fellow
seniors, or to show our support for certain Medicare- or Social
Security-related polices. But we might also associate for the
additional purpose of speaking about these matters with har-
monized and bundled voices. By associating we not only signal
our own beliefs, we throw in our hand with like-minded others
to propose, and perhaps impose, those beliefs on the world.
Justice Harlan was right: "Effective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is unde-
niably enhanced by group association .... "
48
In both of these modes of expressive association, the asso-
ciation itself-the entity, the group, the noun-is, for the most
part, instrumental to some other end.49 The associations' im-
portance consists primarily in serving as a vehicle for the self-
expression of autonomous individuals. 50 The 'association itself
is either a "procedural device for coordinating large numbers of
similar interests" 51 or a place holder for the particular message
48. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460; see also GARVEY, supra note 36,
at 133 (discussing the claim that "[pleople form groups in order to advance
their own interests more effectively").
49. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 ("The Constitution guarantees freedom of as-
sociation of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual
liberties."); id. (noting that "the Court has recognized a right to associate for
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amend-
ment").
50. Id. at 618 ("The Constitution guarantees freedom of association.., as
an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties."); see also
GARVEY, supra note 36, at 143 (noting that, for some, "[aissociations exist to
promote the freedom of their members.... The organizational entity deserves
constitutional protection because it is an instrument of the faithful for advanc-
ing their religious beliefs." (footnote omitted)); The Supreme Court, 1999
Term-Leading Cases, supra note 40, at 262 ("[The right to associate receives
legal recognition only in its instrumental capacity to protect free speech, inso-
far as its abridgment significantly abridges an organization's expression.");
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REV. 447, 487 (2000) (book
review) (suggesting that the institutions of civil society are "sanctuar[ies] for
individual self-expression"); id. at 486 ("Associational life.., has inherent
value for personal development and individual autonomy.").
51. GARVEY, supra note 36, at 149.
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the individual sends by his own "speech through association."52
The association is a "proxy," a pass-through, a verb.
53
There is another way, though, to think about the freedom
of association. Following Henry Adams, we might focus more
on associations themselves and on the role mediating institu-
tions play in safeguarding political liberty and restraining gov-
ernment power. The Court observed in Dale that the freedom
of association is "crucial in preventing the majority from impos-
ing its views on groups that would rather express other, per-
haps unpopular ideas."54 In other words, associations are about
social structure as much self-expression. They get in the way
just as they facilitate. They are the hedgerows of civil society.
They are wrenches in the works of whatever hegemonizing am-
bitions government might be tempted to indulge. 55 We might
remember here Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons, in which
St. Thomas More asks his son-in-law, who has just insisted he
would "cut down every law in England" to "get after the Devil":
[Wihen the last straw was down, and the Devil turned round on you-
where would you hide .... the laws all being flat? This country's
planted thick with laws from coast to coast... and if you cut them
down... d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
would blow then?
5 6
Similarly, for all our attachment to the rhetoric and values of
individualism, autonomy, and self, who among us could hope to
"stand upright in the winds" of benevolent statism without the
cover of mediating associations?
This all goes to show that associations have a structural, as
well as a vehicular, purpose. They hold back the bulk of gov-
ernment and are the "critical buffers between the individual
and the power of the State."57 They are "laboratories of innova-
52. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2415 (2000).
53. The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 40, at 264
(noting that "association enjoys protection as a de facto proxy for expression").
54. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2451 (2000).
55. See ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 202 (1953) ("To-
talitarianism has been well described as the ultimate invasion of human pri-
vacy. But this invasion of privacy is possible only after all the social contexts
of privacy-family, church, association-have been atomized."); Abner S.
Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) ("[The Constitu-
tion's combination of structure and rights prevents the concentration of power
that is the harbinger of despotism.").
56. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 65-66 (Vintage Intl 1990)
(1960).
57. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984); see also Peter L.
Berger & Richard John Neuhaus, Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus
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tion" that clear out the civic space needed to "sustain the ex-
pression of the rich pluralism of American life."58 Associations
are not only conduits for expression, they are the scaffolding
around which civil society is constructed, in which personal
freedoms -are exercised, in which loyalties are formed and
transmitted, and in which individuals flourish.59
Having shifted our focus from the act of associating to the
structural role of associations themselves, we might turn our
attention next from the expressiveness of that act to the ex-
pression of those associations. In so doing, we see yet another
sense, or mode, of the freedom of association. It turns out that
we not only speak through associations and rely on mediating
institutions for the civic space in which to engage in such ex-
pression, but we are also, as Adams suggested, spoken to and
formed by them. Indeed, this is one reason why associations
are able to play their structural role, described above, as soci-
ety's hedgerows. It is not only that they are concentrations or
blocs of political power, which can be marshalled against that
of the state; they are also the state's competitors in the arena of
education and formation. In Roberts, for instance, the Court
observed that "certain kinds of personal bonds"-certain asso-
ciations--'have played a critical role in the culture and tradi-
tions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ide-
als and beliefs. '60  Those "ideals and beliefs" have been
Respond, in TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 145, 148
(Michael Novak ed., 1996) ("[Voluntary associations] stand between the pri-
vate world of individuals and the large, impersonal structures of modem soci-
ety. They 'mediate[]' by constituting a vehicle by which personal beliefs and
values could be transmitted into the mega-institutions.").
58. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 11, at 36 (1977); see also Roberts, 468
U.S. at 622 (noting that associations are "especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from sup-
pression by the majority").
59. See CARTER, supra note 13, at 69 ("Civil society relies for its continua-
tion on a broad panoply of voluntary and involuntary relationships that might
create community in the sense of a place where members may feel that a de-
gree of allegiance is owed: religious tradition, family, friendship, neighbor-
hood, profession."); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Relig-
ion, 50 DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 21 (2000) ("Civil society [is the] network of
voluntary associations, mediating between individuals and the state, that
shape and develop public values and culture."); Kai Nielsen, Reconceptualizing
Civil Society for Now: Some Somewhat Gramscian Turnings, in TOWARD A
GLOBAL CIL SOCIETY 41, 44 (Michael Walzer ed., 1995) ('"By civil society...
I mean the public space between large-scale bureaucratic structures of state
and economy on the one hand, and the private sphere of family, friendships,
personality, and intimacy on the other.'" (citation omitted)).
60. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19; see also McConnell, supra note 59, at 21
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expressed and projected by individuals, through associating;
they have also been instilled, "cultivat[ed]," and "transmitt[ed]"
to persons by and through intermediate associations. Thus,
associations are, as Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus
have put it, "Janus-faced' institutions, facing both 'upward' and
'downward.'"
61
This way of thinking about associations and their expres-
sion can usefully be contrasted with the approach outlined by
Professor Karst in his study of the freedom of "intimate asso-
ciation."62  Karst treats-and praises-associations primarily
(though, of course, not exclusively) as vehicles for choice-fueled
self-discovery: "It is," he tells us, "the choice to form and main-
tain an intimate association that permits full realization of the
associational values we cherish most."63 Even "intimate" asso-
ciations like marriages and families, in the end, derive their
meaning and worth from their status as chosen, and are evalu-
ated primarily in terms of their potential as means to self-
actualization. 64
There is certainly something to this view. Clearly, a "cho-
sen.., association can serve.., as a statement of self-
identification in a way that cannot be matched by an associa-
tion imposed by force of law."65 Still, something is missing from
this picture. Karst's account seems not to capture entirely
what it is that associations are, do, and are for. His primary
emphasis on choice and autonomy leads him perhaps to under-
rate the importance of a crucial anthropological and moral fact
about the human person, namely, that we are "intrinsically, not
contingently, social. We are born to communion, to rationality,"
and to association.66 The point here is not only the obvious bio-
(discussing the "network of voluntary associations, mediating between indi-
viduals and the state, that shape and develop public values and culture" and
observing that, in a truly liberal society, "[tihis important task is left to insti-
tutions independent of the government").
61. Berger & Neuhaus, supra note 57, at 148.
62. See generally Karst, supra note 22 (discussing the expressive qualities
of association).
63. Id. at 637.
64. Id. at 637-52; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
("mhe marital couple is not an independent entity.., but an association of
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.").
But see GARVEY, supra note 36, at 135 ("Individualism supposes that people
form and join groups as one way of exercising protected freedoms more effec-
tively. But organizations may come first, and joining may not be voluntary.").
65. Karst, supra note 22, at 637.
66. Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Dignity of the Human Person and the Idea
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logical one-we are all the physical products of two others-but
also a claim about our development, capacities, ends, and flour-
ishing.
So, it is not just that we express ourselves by choosing to
associate; we who do the choosing are products, at least in large
part, of our given-not chosen-"nest of associations."6 7  But
what does all this tell us about the freedom of associations? As
Dean Garvey has argued, freedoms are not just indifferent ve-
hicles for self-expression, or autonomy-for-autonomy's sake;
freedoms "let us do [good] things."68 Thus, the freedom of asso-
ciation matters not only because it facilitates individuals'
choices and expression, but also because associations do good
things.69 In particular, they educate us. And, as mediating,
buffering institutions they are the fibres of civil society and
create the space in which authentic education is possible.
Within this space, the expression of free and independent asso-
ciations competes with the liberal state for the honor of shaping
our souls.
III. THREE CASES, THREE THEMES
We have seen so far that education is more than the
transmission of data; it includes the inculcation of values, be-
liefs, and loyalties. And, this Essay has argued that "associa-
tion" should serve not only as a verb denoting a mode of indi-
vidual "free speech," or even only as a noun referring to a
vehicle for such expression. We should also make a place in our
of Human Rights: Four Inquiries, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 53, 57 (1999-2000). Pro-
fessor Elshtain adds, in this vein, "The view of the self as an 'autonomous' and
sovereign chooser is so deeply entrenched that in late twentieth century Amer-
ica, at least, it is simply part of the cultural air we breathe." Id. at 58.
67. Indeed, when it comes to the "the kinds of organizations that are most
important in the lives of many people: families, churches, and similar associa-
tions[,] [membership... is imposed rather than chosen." GARVEY, supra note
36, at 135.
68. Id. at 2. That is, "[t]he law leaves us free to do x because it is a good
thing to do x." Id. For example, our law does and ought to protect religious
freedom, not merely because religious belief is one possible reflection among
many of autonomy, or because such freedom is instrumentally necessary to
secure civil peace, but because "religion is important" and a "good thing." Id.
at 42, 49; see also John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious
Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 275, 283 (1996) ("The best reasons for
protecting religious freedom rest on the assumption that religion is a good
thing.").
69. Garvey sets out his own account of the freedom of "groups"-
particularly churches. See GARVEY, supra note 36, at 123-54.
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thinking for the ways expression and education flow back to
persons from associations, shaping those who speak and the
messages they wish to express. That is, we should focus both
on the messages conveyed by individuals to the world through
their acts of associating, and on the messages conveyed through
associations' expression to individuals about the world. This is
because associations are not only instrumentally valuable; they
are also alternative sources of meaning and education, and are
essential both to genuine pluralism and to freedom of thought
and belief.
What does all this have to do with the Supreme Court's ex-
pressive-association docket, and with the contemporary debates
about education and the degree to which the state may or
should supervise the expression of families, schools, churches,
and other associations? This Part tries to build a connection by
reviewing briefly the Court's recent freedom-of-association
cases and by drawing out a few of their more salient themes.
A. OCTOBER TERM 1999 AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE
ASSOCIATION
California Democratic Party v. Jones70 involved a challenge
to yet another California ballot initiative.71 California's voters
eliminated the State's traditional "closed" partisan primary
election system, in which only party members could vote for
that party's nominee, and replaced it with a "blanket primary"
system, in which all registered voters, regardless of party, could
vote for any candidate, regardless of party.72 In other words,
under the new blanket-primary system, anyone who wanted to
was entitled by law to participate in selecting the spokesper-
son, and therefore the message,73 of, say, the Republican,
Green, or Peace and Freedom Party.
Seven Justices agreed that the blanket primary violated
the Democratic Party's fundamental "rights of association."7 4
As Justice Scalia put it, the blanket-primary requirement
"forces political parties to associate with-to have their nomi-
70. 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
71. Id.
72. See id. (describing the two different forms of primary elections).
73. See id. at 2408 ("[11t is the nominee who becomes the party's ambassa-
dor to the general electorate in winning it over to the party's views.").
74. Id. at 2406; see also id. at 2414 ("The burden Propositon 198 [which
created the blanket primary] places on petitioners' rights of political associa-
tion is both severe and unnecessary.").
2001] 1857
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
nees, and hence their positions, determined by-those who, at
best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst,
have expressly affiliated with a rival. ' 5 The Court found this
"forced association"--this "stark repudiation of freedom of po-
litical association" 6-unjustified by any compelling state inter-
ests and, indeed, supported by few valid ones.77 The blanket-
primary requirement, after all, "has the likely outcome-
indeed,... the intended outcome-of changing the parties'
message. 78 The Court insisted, however, that official unhap-
piness with, or disapproval of, an association's message, and a
preference for others, are simply impermissible bases for re-
strictions on expression.
79
Next, Board of Regents v. Southworth8° involved, inter alia,
a freedom-of-association challenge to the University of Wiscon-
sin's allocation of mandatory student-activity fees to political
and ideological groups. 81 If, in California Democratic Party, a
group sought to protect its own message from being garbled by
unwelcome interlopers, in Southworth, the complaint came
from those who claimed they were being compelled to associate
with messages and groups they would just as soon leave alone.
Like many colleges and universities, the University of Wis-
consin charges students at its Madison campus a nonrefund-
able, mandatory student-activities fee. These fees are collected,
pooled, and "used in part to support student organizations en-
gaging in political or ideological speech. '82 Some students ar-
gued that, by requiring them to support financially organiza-
75. Id. at 2409.
76. Id. at 2412.
77. Indeed, in the Court's view, the interests asserted by the State-i.e.,
encouraging "moderation" or "centrism" in parties' nominees--"reduce to noth-
ing more than a stark repudiation of freedom of political association." Id. at
2411-12.
78. Id. at 2412; see also id. at 2414-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The true
purpose of this law.., is to force a political party... to change the party's
doctrinal position on major issues.").
79. See id. at 2412 (disapproving laws whose only "object [is] simply to re-
quire speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent
beneficiaries of the law[s] choose to alter it with messages of their own" (quot-
ing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 578
(1995))); see also Cal. Democratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2405 (noting that the
blanket-primary initiative had been "[piromoted largely as a measure that
would 'weaken' party 'hard-liners' and ease the way for 'moderate problem-
solvers'").
80. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
81. Id. at 227.
82. Id. at 221.
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tions with which they disagreed, or to whose purposes, values,
and messages they strongly objected, the University was com-
mandeering their speech. In these students' view, just as the
California blanket-primary statute had forced political parties
to open their message to revision by outsiders, the allocation of
the required fees to support the groups' rival messages uncon-
stitutionally pressed into service their own expression.
83
The Court disagreed. Although sensitive to the objecting
students' concerns,84 the Court was satisfied, in the end, that
the students' freedom of expression was adequately protected
by a requirement that the fees be allocated on a viewpoint-
neutral basis.85 After all, the Court reminded us, such a view-
point-neutral funding mechanism had been found in Rosenber-
ger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia86 to guarantee
that the expression of a university-funded religious newspaper
could not reasonably be regarded as the expression of the Uni-
versity.8 7 There is, the Southworth Court insisted, a "symme-
try" here: students who object to the messages of organizations
funded with student-activities fees are assured, by the view-
point-neutrality of the disbursal policies, that they are associat-
ing with a more general educational project-with the creation
and maintenance of an "open dialogue"--and not with the val-
ues or expression of particular organizations.
88
Finally, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,89 the Justices re-
affirmed that the Constitution permits a private group to ex-
clude those whose leadership or participation might cloud, or
even contradict, its message.90 The New Jersey Supreme Court
83. See id. at 229 ("Respondents alleged, inter alia, that imposition of the
segregated fee violated their rights of free speech, free association, and free
exercise under the First Amendment.").
84. Id. at 232. (noting the "high potential for intrusion on the First
Amendment rights of the objecting students").
85. See id. at 233-34 ("We conclude that the University of Wisconsin may
sustain the extracurricular dimensions of its programs by using mandatory
student fees with viewpoint neutrality as the operational principle."). The
Court concluded that the student-referendum mechanism did not guarantee
the constitutionally required "viewpoint neutrality" in the allocation of the
fees. Id. at 233.
86. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
87. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233 (discussing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
88. Id.
89. 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2451 (2000).
90. Id. at 2451, 2458 ("[Plublic or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an or-
ganization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organi-
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had held that the Boy Scouts violated that State's public-
accommodations law by revoking the membership of James
Dale, an assistant scoutmaster, after Dale, who is gay, began
speaking publicly about his sexual orientation. The New Jer-
sey court was unmoved by the Boy Scouts' expressive-
association claim, insisting that its message and purpose would
not be undermined by Dale's own expression or activism, and
also that any burden on the Scouts' right of association was jus-
tified by the State's own compelling interest in eliminating "the
destructive consequences of discrimination from our society."91
The Supreme Court reversed. 92 The Court determined that
the Boy Scouts is an association that "engages in expressive ac-
tivity,"93 that it regards homosexuality as inconsistent with its
values, 94 that it was not the place of the New Jersey Supreme
Court to second-guess the Scouts on this point, and that requir-
ing the Scouts to retain Dale as a scoutmaster would "surely in-
terfere with [its] choice not to propound a point of view contrary
to its beliefs."95 And so, the Court concluded, the New Jersey
court's effort to require that the Scouts accept Dale "runs afoul
of the Scouts' freedom of expressive association."
96
B. COMMON THEMES: REASONABLE PLURALISM, JUDICIAL
HUMILITY, AND SUBSIDIARITY
These three cases deserve, and will no doubt receive, a
great deal of thoughtful attention, study, and comment.97 For
zation to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the or-
ganization's expressive message."); cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi-
sexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995) ("Disapproval of a private speaker's
statement does not legitimize use of the Commonwealth's power to compel the
speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to others.").
91. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2450 (citation omitted).
92. It appears from the opinions that the Court initially decided to affr,
but Justice Stevens lost his majority. See John P. Elwood, What Were They
Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October Term 1999, 4 GREEN BAG 2D
27, 30 (2000).
93. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2454.
96. Id. at 2455.
97. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doc-
trine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000) (surveying the Supreme Court's 1999
Term); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case
of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000) (scrutinizing the Dale deci-
sion).
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present purposes, though, it is enough to note briefly three re-
lated and common themes.
First, the Court in these cases appears not to resist, and
seems even to accept, the inevitability of reasonable disagree-
ment on important political and moral questions. 98 In Dale, for
example, the Chief Justice notes in passing that the Boy Scouts
have one view with respect to the morality of homosexual con-
duct, while many others in contemporary society subscribe to
another.99 Neither the traditional nor the more latitudinarian
view is pronounced correct and neither is criticized. 1 ° Simi-
larly, in California Democratic Party, the majority's point is not
that the blanket primary's supporters' preference for "moder-
ate" rather than polarizing or "ideological" candidates is ill-
founded, but simply that the Constitution does not permit the
government to accommodate that political preference at the ex-
pense of political parties' freedom of expression. 10'
Second, the Court also acknowledges candidly its own and
government's limited competence and prerogative to resolve au-
thoritatively such disagreements. Given that there are, after
all, "many reasonable... worldviews that are compatible with
good citizenship,... it is neither necessary nor desirable to at-
98. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,229 (2000) ("It is
inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies...
[which are] contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of some of
its citizens."); id. at 232 ("It is all but inevitable that the fees will result in
subsidies to speech which some students find objectionable and offensive to
their personal beliefs.").
99. 120 S. Ct. at 2457.
100. See id. ("The First Amendment protects expression, be it of the popu-
lar variety or not.... And the fact that an idea may be embraced and advo-
cated by increasing numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the
First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice a different view."); South-
worth, 529 U.S. at 229 ('The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that mi-
nority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views.").
The dissenters in Dale were less willing to suspend judgment on this mat-
ter: "Unfavorable opinions about homosexuals 'have ancient roots.... Like
equally atavistic opinions about certain racial groups, those roots have been
nourished by sectarian doctrine." 120 S. Ct. at 2477 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 2478 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Scouts' policy is
"the product of a habitual way of thinking about strangers"); id. at 2479
(Souter, J., dissenting) ('The fact that we are cognizant of th[e] laudable de-
cline in stereotypical thinking on homosexuality should not, however, be taken
to control the resolution of this case.").
101. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2414 (2000) (sug-
gesting alternative means of ensuring "more choice, greater participation, in-
creased 'privacy,' and a sense of 'fairness'-all without severely burdening a
political party's First Amendment right of association").
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tempt to force disagreement."1 0 2 In the Court's view, its task is
not to side with either camp in the "Culture Wars,"10 3 and cer-
tainly not to end them,104 but only to enforce the Constitution's
guarantee that persons and associations may speak for them-
selves, and cannot be required by government to endorse or
promote the values of others. 10 5 Government is, of course, free
to promote, and even to require, non-discrimination in truly
public contexts, 10 6 but it cannot homogenize civil society by
pressing into service the expression of mediating associations.
Similarly, although government can, to some extent, regulate
political associations' conduct in pursuit of clean elections and
public confidence, 10 7 it cannot decide that these associations are
saying the wrong thing, and require them to say something
else. 08 "In a free society," as Justice Kennedy put it in Califor-
102. Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 453, 454 (2000) ("Not all private associations will inculcate pub-
lic virtue .... ").
103. See generally JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1991) (discussing cultural friction in the United States).
104. For a different perspective, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a
case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive contro-
versy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision
has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry.
It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution.
Id. at 866-67.
105. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452 ("[Ilt is not the role of the courts to reject
a group's expressed values because they disagree with those values or find
them internally inconsistent."); Cal. Democratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2415
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("A political party might be better served by allowing
blanket primaries .... Under the First Amendment's guarantee of speech
through free association, however, this is an issue for the party to resolve, not
for the State[s]."); Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232 ("It is not for the Court to say
what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher
learning."); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 575 (1994) ("But whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a
speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is pre-
sumed to lie beyond the government's power to control.").
106. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455-56 (discussing public accommodations laws).
107. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143-44 (1976) (per curiam) (holding
that individual contribution limits, disclosure and reporting provisions, and a
public financing scheme are limits on campaign spending and contribution
that do not offend freedom of association).
108. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452 ("[A]s is true of all expressions of First
Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the ground that they
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nia Democratic Party, "the State is directed by political doc-
trine, and not the other way around."109
Finally, the Court appears in these cases not only to be
reconciled to the "fact of reasonable pluralism,"110 and appro-
priately humble about its own moral capacities, but also to ap-
preciate the importance of the principle of subsidiarity."' That
is, the Court seems to acknowledge-and even celebrate-the
place of mediating associations, their expression, and their di-
versity in civic life.112 The Court seems to respect and welcome
the moral independence of intermediate institutions and to ac-
cept the fact of competition between these associations and
government for the beliefs and loyalties of individuals. The
Court recognizes what we discussed above, namely, that this
moral independence and competition promote individual free-
dom by creating channels and vehicles for expression, by check-
view a particular expression as unwise or irrational." (citation omitted)); id. at
2458 ("[The law] is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however
enlightened either purpose may strike the government.").
109. 120 S. Ct. at 2416.
110. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1993).
111. See supra note 6 (defining "subsidiarity").
112. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451 (observing that freedom of association is
"especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in
shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority" (quoting
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))); id. at 2454 (noting that
"associations do not have to associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a cer-
tain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amend-
ment"); Cal. Democratic Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2408 ("Representative democracy
in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of citi-
zens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who es-
pouse their political views."); Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231 (noting the "impor-
tance" of associations such as universities, labor unions, and bar associations
to the "fulfillment of... personal aspirations" and "potential"); id. at 1356
("The University may determine that its mission is well served if students
have the means to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, reli-
gious.... and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the
lecture hall.").
For an examination of political parties' positions as voluntary associations
in civil society, see generally Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediat-
ing Institutions, 61 U. CI. L. REV. 1479 (1994).
And, it is worth noting that the Court in Dale and California Democratic
Party referred regularly to the association in question as "it" and not "they."
See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452 ("The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct
is inconsistent with the values [it seeks to instill]."); Cal. Democratic Party,
120 S. Ct. at 2411 ("Ordinarily,... being saddled with an unwanted, and pos-
sibly antithetical, nominee would not destroy the party but severely transform
it.").
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ing the state's ideological ambitions, and by sustaining a true
public square between persons and state.
113
These three are, to be sure, overlapping and complemen-
tary themes. They neither capture entirely nor exhaust the
significance of the Dale, Southworth, and California Democ-
ratic Party cases. Still, they stand out clearly and cohere in
support of the general observation that this Court, in the latest
expressive-association decisions, appears healthily resigned to
the crooked timber of free society.
14
IV. SCHOOLS, FAMILIES, AND THE EXPRESSION OF
ASSOCIATIONS
The goal so far has been to sketch an approach to the
Court's recent freedom-of-expressive-association cases, one that
focuses as much on the expression of associations as on expres-
sion through association, and as much on the messages we re-
ceive from associations as on those we send through them. The
argument for this approach is built on the claim that the ability
and right of mediating institutions to form, shape, and educate
us through their expression is vital to a thriving civil society
and necessary for authentic human freedom.
This Part is a kind of "test run" for this approach; it exam-
ines the Court's Mitchell and Troxel decisions in freedom-of-
association terms. So read, the Mitchell case turns out to be
not just another fact-bound application of the "Lemon test,"115
113. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451 (noting that freedom of association is "crucial
in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would
rather express other, perhaps unpopular ideas"); see also Cal. Democratic
Party, 120 S. Ct. at 2416 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("When the State seeks to
regulate a political party's nomination process as a means to shape and control
political doctrine and the scope of political choice, the First Amendment gives
substantial protection to the party from the manipulation.").
114. Immanuel Kant famously insisted, "Out of timber so crooked as that
from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built." ISAIAH BER-
LIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY xi (Henry Hardy ed., 1991) (quoting
Immanuel Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbiirgerlicher Ab-
sicht (1784)).
115. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion... finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion"). In Mitchell v. Helms, a plurality observed that the Lemon test had been
"modified" inAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), and that, "for purposes of
evaluating aid to schools," courts should examine only the first and second
Lemon factors. 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2540 (2000) (plurality opinion).
For analysis and critique of Lemon, see generally Lamb's Chapel v. Center
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but also a vindication of families' and religious associations' ex-
pressive and educational freedom. Similarly, Troxel can be
read not only as a case about third-party-visitation disputes,
but also about the independence of the family, the dignity of its
educational vocation,116 and the limits the Constitution imposes
on the homogenizing ambitions of government.
A. MITCHELL V. HELMS: RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AS MEDIATING
INSTITUTIONS AND "INDOCTRINATION" AS EXPRESSION
In Mitchell v. Helms,117 six Justices agreed that the Estab-
lishment Clause permits state and local governments to loan
"educational materials and equipment"-library books, com-
puters, televisions, etc.-purchased with federal funds to reli-
gious and private schools. 118 Fifteen years after the program in
question (Chapter 2) was challenged in a Louisiana federal dis-
trict court,119 the Court held that providing "secular, neutral,
and nonideological" 120 assistance directly to authentically reli-
gious-or, in Establishment Clause argot, "pervasively sectar-
ian"--schools, on a per-child basis, did not have the "primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion," and therefore did not
run afoul of the First Amendment's no-establishment rule.121
Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) ("As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence once again .... ."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon
Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993) (arguing that the Lemon test was
functionally replaced by a coercion test in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992)).
116. See Pope John Paul II, Familiaris consortio [Apostolic Exhortation On
the Family] 38 (St. Paul eds., 1981) (Apostolic Exhortation), available at
http'i/listserv.american.edu/catholielchurch/papal/jp.ii/familiar.consorti (refer-
ring to the "dignity and vocation" of families' "educational role").
117. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 2536; see also id. at 2537-38 (describing details of the "Chapter
2" program). For a more detailed analysis of the Mitchell opinion than can be
provided in this Essay, see David S. Petron, Finding Direction in Indirection:
The Direct/Indirect Aid Distinction in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1233 (2000).
119. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2538 (plurality opinion) ("The case's tortu-
ous history over the [last] 15 years illustrates well the degree to which our Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while neverthe-
less retaining anomalies with which the lower courts have had to struggle.").
120. Id. at 2537 (plurality opinion) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1) (2000)).
121. Id. at 2540 (plurality opinion) ("Considering Chapter 2 in light of our
more recent case law, we conclude that it neither results in religious indoctri-
nation by the government nor defines its recipients by reference to religion.").
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1841
Justice Thomas wrote for the four-Justice plurality. The
key question, as he saw it, was whether Chapter 2 had the
"primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion."122 Justice
Thomas concluded that it did not.123 More particularly, he rea-
soned that Chapter 2 did not "result[U in governmental indoc-
trination" because "any religious indoctrination that occurs in
these schools could [not] reasonably be attributed to govern-
mental action."1 24 This conclusion rested on two crucial fea-
tures of the program: "neutrality" and "private choice.1 25 That
is, Chapter 2 resources are made available on the basis of crite-
ria having nothing to do with religion, 126 and benefits disbursed
by the government reach religious schools not by official fiat
but only to the extent that individual parents select and their
children attend such schools.
127
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in
the judgment. 128 She agreed with Justice Thomas that "Chap-
ter 2 does not define aid recipients by reference to religion" and
that the program does not "result[] in governmental indoctrina-
tion."129 She could not agree, though, that the "neutrality" of a
government program will always be outcome-determinative-
particularly not in cases involving "direct" aid to religious
schools. 130 In such cases, even when aid is allocated according
122. Id. (plurality opinion)
123. Id. (plurality opinion) ("We ... hold that Chapter 2 is not a "law re-
specting an establishment of religion.'").
124. Id. at 2541.
125. Id. at 2541-47 (discussing the importance of these features in the
Court's other relevant Establishment Clause decisions).
126. Id. at 2552 ("The program makes a broad array of schools eligible for
aid without regard to their religious affiliations or lack thereof.").
127. Id. at 2541-42. "Chapter 2 aid... reaches participating schools only
as a consequence of private decision making. Private decision making controls
because of the per capita allocation scheme, and those decisions are independ-
ent because of the program's neutrality." Id. at 2552-53 (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
128. Id. at 2572 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Given the important similari-
ties between the Chapter 2 program here and the Title 1 program at issue in
Agostini, respondents' Establishment Clause challenge must fail.").
129. Id. at 2561 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. Justice O'Connor expressed concern with the plurality's "rule of un-
precedented breadth" and specifically with Justice Thomas's "near absolute"
emphasis on the neutrality of the Chapter 2 program and his lack of interest
in the possibility of "diversion" of funds to "religious indoctrination." Id. at
2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The plurality's treatment of neutrality
comes close to assigning that factor singular importance in the future adjudi-
cation of Establishment Clause challenges to government school-aid pro-
grams."). For more on the nature and importance of the distinction between
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to formally neutral criteria, there is a heightened danger that
the assistance will be perceived by reasonable observers as an
endorsement of religion. Neutral criteria are not enough, and
any "actual diversion" of government aid to the advancement of
religion is unconstitutional. 131
Mitchell is welcome step in what many see as the Court's
gradual rehabilitation of its Establishment Clause doctrine. 32
But Mitchell can also be read, consistent with the approach
suggested here, as a case about the freedom of expressive asso-
ciation and the importance of associations' expression. Two as-
pects of the decision are especially worth emphasizing.
First, it seems fairly clear after Mitchell that-whatever
their merits as policy proposals 133-- "school choice" programs
are permitted by the First Amendment, even if they do not ex-
clude religious schools.134 In a nutshell, these programs pro-
vide public funds to help parents pay for their children's educa-
tion, even if the children attend private and religious schools,
so long as the schools meet the programs' education-related eli-
gibility criteria. These funds are allocated to parents on the
"direct" and "indirect" aid, see generally Petron, supra note 118.
131. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct at 2558, 2556 ("[T]he plurality's approval of actual
diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is in tension with our
precedents and, in any event, unnecessary to decide the instant case."). It is
important to note that, for Justice O'Connor, it is actual diversion to the ad-
vancement of religion, and not "reasonable divertibility," that invalidates a
school-aid program. Id. at 2565-66 (rejecting the claim that "we should treat
as constitutionally suspect any form of secular aid that might conceivably be
diverted to a religious use"). In her view, however, there was no evidence in
the record of any significant "actual diversion." Id. at 2569 (noting that the
"safeguards employed by the program [against such diversion] are constitu-
tionally sufficient"). But see id. at 2591-96 (Souter, J., dissenting) (insisting
both on the divertibility of the aid in question and that aid had in fact been
diverted).
132. For one (among hundreds) helpful summary and critique of this doc-
trine and an account of its evolution, see, for example, JOHN WITTE, JR., RE-
LIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES 149-84 (2000).
133. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS,
AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN,
EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978); VITERITr,
supra note 20; JOHN F. WITE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM (2000).
134. For a (very) few recent discussions of this question, see generally John
H. Garvey, What Does the Constitution Say About Vouchers?, 44 B.B. J. 14
(2000); Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil Libertarian Case for the Constitutionality
of School Choice, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (1999/2000); Eugene Vo-
lokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 341 (1999).
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basis of criteria having nothing to do with religion-income,
place of residence, quality of the local public schools, etc.-and
no money ever finds its way to the "coffers" of religious schools
unless there is an intervening, individual, private choice by a
parent that such a school is best for her child.
135
Both the plurality and concurring opinions in Mitchell in-
dicate that choice programs more or less of the kind just de-
scribed should survive Establishment Clause review.1 36 Such
programs are consistent with the "principles of neutrality and
private choice" that Justice Thomas emphasized, 137 and also
with the views set out in Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Re-
member that, although she and Justice Breyer were reluctant
to accord talismanic significance to a direct-aid program's for-
mal neutrality, they also made clear their view that "true pri-
vate-choice programs" differ from "per-capita-aid programs."138
Under the former, the use of government aid for "the advance-
ment of religion" is "wholly dependent on the student's private
decision," and there is little danger the aid will create the im-
pression that the government endorses a school's religious ac-
tivities or instruction.139
Second, it is worth noting that the Mitchell plurality nois-
ily distanced itself from some of the Court's Establishment
Clause precedents, going out of its way to downplay the consti-
tutional significance of an aid-receiving school's "pervasively
sectarian" character. 140 Justice Thomas insisted that the ques-
135. The Court has acquired the unfortunate habit in school-aid cases of
assuming that religious schools have "coffers" rather than, say, "checking ac-
counts." See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2562 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
136. But see Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000) (in-
validating the Cleveland voucher program as a violation of the Establishment
Clause). Zelman was quite wrongly decided; it should and likely will be re-
versed. See Judgment Day, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2000, at A26. That said,
Professor Laycock has wisely warned against taking too much for granted in
this area. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40
CATH. LAW. 25, 53 (2000) ("If you take Rosenberger, Agostini, and Mitchell to
their logical conclusion, vouchers are constitutional-but no one should as-
sume the cases will be carried to their logical conclusion.").
137. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2542 (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 2559 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor's concurrence.
139. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2550-52 (plurality opinion) ("The dissent is correct that there
was a period when this factor mattered, particularly if the pervasively sectar-
ian school was a primary or secondary school.... But that period is one that
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tion in school-aid cases should be whether a school is capable of
advancing effectively the government's secular purpose, not
whether the school's curriculum or character crosses a pur-
ported line between permissible and excessive degrees of religi-
osity.141 The kind of "trolling through a person's or institution's
religious beliefs" required by such line-drawing is, he asserted,
both "offensive" and constitutionally unnecessary. 142 The plu-
rality also pointed out the historical connection between the
Court's use and constitutionalization of the "pervasively sectar-
ian" category and the anti-Catholicism that has, on too many
occasions, clouded policies, decisions, and debate about educa-
tion. 143 Justice Thomas performed a valuable service by expos-
ing the unsightly pedigree of this category, which has too often
served as little more than a judicial means of laundering previ-
ous generations' prejudices. 144
Given these two points, Mitchell contributes to our discus-
sion of the freedom of association in at least three ways. First,
the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past.").
141. Id. at 2551 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas noted,
[T]he religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitu-
tional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the gov-
ernment's secular purpose.... [So long as the aid is made available
on a neutral basis, tihe pervasively sectarian recipient has not re-
ceived any special favor, and it is most bizarre that the Court
would... reserve special hostility for those who take their religion
seriously, who think that their religion should affect the whole of
their lives, or who make the mistake of being effective in transmitting
their views to children.
Id.
142. Id. (plurality opinion). For an example of such "trolling," see id. at
2592-93 (Souter, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2551-52 (plurality opinion). ("[Hiostility to aid to pervasively
sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to dis-
avow.... This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now."). But see id. at
2597 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing "the plurality's choice to employ impu-
tations of bigotry and irreligion as terms in the Court's debate").
144. The Mitchell plurality was apparently assisted by the amicus curiae
Brief of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct.
2530 (2000) (No. 98-1648) (on file with author). Although it is not possible
here to demonstrate conclusively or document exhaustively the point, it is
simply a fact that suspicion of the Roman Catholic Church, and concerns
about some of its teachings, have long shaped, if not dictated, constitutional
doctrine in the educational arena. For a helpful introduction to this issue, see
John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intel-
lectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 84 J. AM. HIST. 97 (1997); see also, Ira C.
Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 375, 385-92 (1999) (describing the
place of anti-Catholicism and negative stereotypes about Catholic education in
the development of modern Establishment Clause doctrine).
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and most straight-forwardly, school choice makes available to
parents new opportunities for expression through association.
As Professor Gilles has argued, "Parents are... 'speakers' for
First Amendment purposes when they communicate indirectly
with their children through the speech of schools, teachers,
home tutors, or other educational intermediaries." 145 And this
is true not only when parents speak through such intermediar-
ies, but also when they make "decisions about whether, when,
and through which such intermediaries they prefer to commu-
nicate with their children."146 Put simply, parents speak-both
to their children and to the world-when they make decisions
about what, where, and from whom their children will learn:
Schools that are freely chosen are the proxies for parental ideas that
seek entry into the public dialogue. Today those who can afford to do
so often choose a school precisely because it preserves and projects a
certain deposit of belief.... The school is a loudspeaker for those who
freely support it with their presence and wish to cooperate in its mes-
sage. 47
Second, Mitchell's apparent validation of nondiscrimina-
tory school-choice programs-i.e., programs that do not exclude
authentically religious schools-highlights the structural, me-
diating role of associations themselves. 148 After all, it is rea-
sonable to think that well crafted school-choice programs could
not only invigorate already-existing intermediate institutions-
namely, religious schools-but also spur the creation of new
ones. 149 The point here is not just that school choice is likely to
145. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63
U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 1016 (1996). See generally id. at 1012-33 (describing the
"Freedom of Speech as a Source of Parental Educational Rights").
146. Id. at 1018.
147. John E. Coons, School Choice as Simple Justice, FIRST THINGS, Apr.
1992, at 17; see also supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing ex-
pression through association).
148. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing the struc-
tural role of associations and their expression).
149. That said, some argue that school-choice programs will undermine
and compromise the religious mission and mediating capacities of religious
schools. Indeed, some regard such programs as an opportunity to subject such
schools to more exacting scrutiny and oversight. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer,
School Vouchers: Inviting the Public into the Religious Square, 42 WM & MARY
L. REV. 963 (2001). It cannot be denied that the increased government regula-
tion and oversight that could be expected to follow school-choice funds
threaten these schools' integrity and authenticity:
[T]he concerns about "strings" are reasonable. Distinctively religious
institutions are vital to a healthy civil society. These institutions can
play that role only if they are independent of government control. Re-
ligious institutions "are the giant rocks on which civil society rests."
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strengthen associations by encouraging competition and entre-
preneurship in education. It is also that, by committing itself
to diversity, pluralism, and choice, and by abandoning the no-
tion that the government's monopoly in the provision of pub-
licly funded education is the constitutional and moral base-
line,150 the state retreats, if only a little, from the public square,
leaving just a little more room in civil society for the little pla-
toons of democracy to thrive, to mediate, and-for better or
worse-to educate.
Finally, by repudiating its former emphasis on the "perva-
sively sectarian" character of religious schools-or, more accu-
rately, of Catholic schools151-the plurality in Mitchell sent an
important message about the expression of these associations
and the nature of education. Recall that the Court's "perva-
sively sectarian" category, like our Nation's longstanding
(though dissipating) unease about Catholic schools generally,
152
has for the most part reflected concerns about and objections to
what these schools say. We saw in Part I that education is the
process by which the expression of associations shapes souls.
This was, for the Court, precisely the problem. Put differently,
the Court's problem with the expression of these particular as-
sociations-i.e., "pervasively sectarian" schools-was that this
expression was not education, but "indoctrination."
The term "indoctrination" litters the Court's school-aid
cases-even Mitchell-but it is a "term more often used...
than explained."1 53 It has served primarily to denote the nar-
No one should treat lightly any threats to that foundation. We are
cautiously optimistic that sound constitutional interpretation will
yield clear re-affirmations of the rule that religious schools are not
required to purchase equal treatment by abandoning religion.
Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amend-
ment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 340-41 (2000)
150. See Volokh, supra note 134, at 360-63 (responding to the argument
that school choice would "hurt... government-run schools" and emphasizing
that these schools' current monopoly on public education funds need not be
taken as a constitutional "given").
151. See Lupu, supra note 144, at 386 ("From the advent of publicly sup-
ported, compulsory education until very recently, aid to sectarian schools pri-
marily meant aid to Catholic schools."); Michael W. McConnell, Why is Reli-
gious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1263-64 (2000).
See generally Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of
the Term "Sectarian," 6 J.L. & POL. 449 (1990).
152. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
153. Brief of Amicus Curiae Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights
at 25, Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (No. 98-1648). For an interest-
ing discussion of the problems inherent in identifying "indoctrination," par-
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row, sectarian, and divisive expression of Catholic schools, and
as a foil for the citizen-building, unifying, educational expres-
sion of the government's schools.154 Justice Douglas, for exam-
ple, asserted in Lemon that "sectarian" schools exist not for the
common good but to "give the church the opportunity to indoc-
trinate its creed delicately and indirectly, or massively through
doctrinal courses." 155 In support, he quoted at length a notori-
ous anti-Catholic tract:
"In the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included in
every subject. History, literature, geography, civics, and science are
given a Roman Catholic slant. The whole education of the child is
filled with propaganda. That, of course, is the very purpose of such
schools, the very reason for going to all of the work and expense of
maintaining a dual school system. Their purpose is not so much to
educate, but to indoctrinate and train, not to teach Scripture truths
and Americanism, but to make loyal Roman Catholics. The children
are regimented, and are told what to wear, what to do, and what to
think."1 56
A few years earlier, dissenting from a decision permitting
states to loan textbooks to parochial-school students, Justice
Black had railed in similar terms against the educational ex-
pression of Catholic schools:
ticularly in matters of religion and education, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He
Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Para-
dox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 611 (1993). This task is
made more difficult by the fact that, as one court observed, "a principal func-
tion of all elementary and secondary education is indoctrinative-whether it
be to teach the ABC's or multiplication tables or to transmit the basic values of
the community." James v. Bd of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972); see
also supra note 121, text accompanying note 124.
154. As Justice Brennan stated in Abington Township School District v.
Schempp,
It is implicit in the history and character of American public educa-
tion that the public schools serve a uniquely public function: the
training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divi-
sive, or separatist influences of any sort .... This is a heritage nei-
ther theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic and patriotic.
374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
155. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 630-31 (1971) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
156. Id. at 635 n.20 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting LORAINE BOETINER,
ROMAN CATHOLICISM 360 (1962)). The late-Nineteenth Century preacher and
education reformer Horace Bushnell had voiced similar concerns, warning
that children in Catholic schools "'will be shut up in schools that do not teach
them what, as Americans, they most of all need to know .... They will be in-
structed mainly into the foreign prejudices and superstitions of their fathers,
and the state, which proposes to be clear of all sectarian affinities in religion,
will pay the bills!'" Glenn, supra note 20, at 229 (quoting Horace Bushnell).
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The same powerful sectarian religious propagandists who have suc-
ceeded in securing passage of the present law to help religious schools
carry on their sectarian religious purposes can and doubtless will con-
tinue their propaganda, looking toward complete domination and su-
premacy of their particular brand of religion. And it nearly always is
by insidious approaches that the citadels of liberty are most success-
fully attacked.1 57
It seems, then, that by "indoctrination" the Court cannot have
meant-and those who continue to use the term today cannot
mean-much more than the effective transmission of ideas,
values, or ways of thinking that do not cohere entirely with
those of the state. If this is true, though, then-as we saw in
Part I-it is hard to see how "indoctrination" is anything other
than the expression of one's competitor in the project of forming
persons and shaping souls, or how the pervasively-sectarian
category reflects anything more than official disagreement with
certain associations' expression. 158 After all, the liberal state,
no less than "pervasively sectarian" schools and other mediat-
ing, possibly dissenting, associations in society, is not and can-
not be indifferent to the beliefs and values, the totems and ta-
boos, of its citizens. 159 This is why, as Henry Adams observed,
"[all State education is a sort of dynamo machine for polarizing
the popular mind; for turning and holding [it] in the direction
supposed to be the most effective for State purposes." 60
157. Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251-52
(1968) (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 260 n.9 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(warning of the "creeping sectarianism" in Catholic schools' instruction, even
in nominally secular subjects).
158. Cf Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2551 (plurality opinion) ("It is most bizarre
that the Court would... reserve special hostility for those who take their re-
ligion seriously, who think that their religion should affect the whole of their
lives, or who make the mistake of being effective in transmitting their views to
children.").
159. Edmund Burke observed that "it is the interest, and it is the duty,...
of government to attend much to opinions." Edmund Burke, Speech on the Pe-
tition of the Unitarians (May 11, 1792), in 7 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HON.
EDMuND BURKE 39, 44 (Little Brown, 9th ed. 1889); see also supra notes 32-35
and accompanying text (noting that the health and survival of the liberal state
depends on the creation of citizens of a particular disposition).
It should be noted here that, unlike Justices Black and Douglas, Catholic
teaching clearly repudiates "indoctrination" as a method of education. Second
Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dignitatis humanae [Declaration on Religious
Liberty] %% 3, 4 (1965).
160. EDUCATION, supra note 12, at 78. Justice Douglas lodged a similar
complaint against Catholic schools. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 260 n.9 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("[Catholic schools'] creeping sectarianism... keeps the stu-
dents continually reminded of the sectarian orientation of his education.").
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The Mitchell plurality's rejection of the pervasively-
sectarian category can therefore be read as a rejection also of
the Court's previous assumption that there is something par-
ticularly un-education-like or otherwise unworthy about what
authentically religious schools do. These schools, like the gov-
ernment's schools, transmit values and form persons, implicitly
and explicitly, 161 through their teachers' speech and witness,
their curricula, their trappings, and their expression. To be
sure, as the early proponents of the Common Schools feared
and many contemporary liberal theorists recognize, 162 these as-
sociations often speak with a different voice, invoke different
premises, appeal to different loyalties, and transmit different--
not always praiseworthy163-values. In doing, they provide
some shelter from the often hostile winds of the secular state's
citizen-creating aspirations.164 Benjamin Rush once called for a
"'general and uniform system of education' that would "'render
the mass of the people more homogenous and thereby fit them
more easily for uniform and peaceable government. 1 65 The
Mitchell plurality's refusal to attach an epithet like "indoctrina-
tion" to associations' expression affirms, if only implicitly, the
161. See Mark Tushnet, Thinking About the Constitution at the Cusp, 34
AKRON L. REV. 21, 22 (2000) (observing that schools have an "implicit curricu-
lum-the things that are taught by, or through, the way a school room is or-
ganized, the way teachers and students treat each other, and the like").
162. See supra notes 20-21, 28-35 and accompanying text. This is why
some have argued that even private schools must be required to embrace and
transmit the state's messages, and the set of values, loyalties, and traits that
the state deems necessary for useful citizenship. See GUTMANN, supra note
33, at 115-23; see also Russell Hittinger, The Future of the Papacy: A Sympo-
sium, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2001, at 28, 29 (recalling "Bismarck's Kulturkampf,
when the Prussian state interrupted the governance of the Catholic
Church... on the basis of the state's interest in promoting its own culture
through education").
163. CARTER, supra note 13, at 42-45 (noting that some mediating institu-
tions inculcate the wrong values); Berger & Neuhaus, supra note 57, at 150
("[Tihere are (to put it plainly) both good and bad mediating structures .... ");
Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 453, 457 (2000) ("Not all private associations will inculcate public vir-
tue ....").
164. See BOLT, supra note 56, at 66; Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyr-
dom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (1999) ("The State is hostile or unfriendly to
religion in its very essence."). Indeed, as a historical matter, parochial schools
in this country were a response to the aggressive Protestantism of the gov-
ernment's purportedly non-sectarian common schools. See generally GLENN,
supra note 20.
165. GLENN, supra note 20, at 89 (quoting Benjamin Rush).
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place and role of mediating institutions in educating persons
and in hamstringing the ambition of the liberal state.
B. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE: THE FAMILY AS THE "FIRST AND
VITAL CELL OF SOCIETY"
1 6 6
In Troxel v. Granville,167 the Washington Supreme Court
had struck down that State's third-party-visitation statute as
inconsistent with parents' fundamental right to direct and con-
trol the upbringing and education of their children. 168 That
unusually expansive statute permitted "any person" to petition
for court-ordered visitation of someone else's child "at any
time," and authorized courts to grant such a petition, over cus-
todial parents' objection, whenever visitation would serve the
child's "best interest." No deference to parents' objections, nor
any showing that the visitation requested is necessary to avoid
harm to the child, was required. 169 Insisting that parents "have
a right to limit visitation of their children with third persons,"
that parents, not judges, "should be the ones to choose whether
to expose their children to certain people or ideas," and that it
is not for the state "to make significant decisions concerning
the custody of children merely because it could make a 'better'
decision," the Washington court invalidated the statute.
170
A majority of the Justices shared the Washington court's
concerns about the breadth and intrusiveness of the statute.
171
Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, found particu-
larly offensive the fact that the statute required "no deference"
to parents' wishes and accorded their decisions no "presump-
tion of validity."172 Instead, "the Washington statute places the
best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge.
166. Familiaris consortio, supra note 116, 9t 42 (quoting Second Vatican
Ecumenical Council, Apostolicam actuositatem [Decree on the Apostolate of the
Laity] 9I 11 (1965)).
167. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
168. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28-31 (Wash. 1998), affd sub nom. Troxel v.
Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion).
169. For more detailed discussions of the statute, see WASH. REV. CODE.
Section 26.10.160(3) (2001). See generally Smith, 969 P.2d at 23, 30; Troxel,
120 S. Ct. at 2061-64 (plurality opinion).
170. Smith, 969 P.2d at 31.
171. Although Justice Scalia dissented, he did so not because he was un-
troubled by the statute's intrusiveness, but because of his well-known rejection
of the substantive-due-process theory on which the Court relied in invalidating
the statute's application. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2074-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2061 (plurality opinion).
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Should the judge disagree with the parents' estimation of the
child's best interest, the judge's view necessarily prevails."
173
The Constitution, in her view, requires more; it "does not per-
mit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to
make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge be-
lieves a 'better' decision could be made."174 The Washington
statute purported to do just that and therefore was, as applied
to Troxel's facts, unconstitutional. 175
Six Justices wrote opinions in Troxel-the most in any case
from the 1999 Term. 176 The details and implications of the
case's reasoning177 and holding 78 are not entirely clear. Still,
the Court re-affirmed that the "liberty" protected by the Four-
173. Id. (plurality opinion).
174. Id. at 2064 (plurality opinion). It is important to note that Justice
O'Connor did not endorse the Washington Supreme Court's conclusion that
the fundamental constitutional rights of parents to direct the upbringing of
their own children "requireU all nonparental visitation statutes to include a
showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to
granting visitation." Id.; cf. In re Smith, 969 P.2d at 28-30; Garnett, supra
note 29, at 135 ("If we take Pierce seriously, state supervention of parents'
educational authority is justified only to prevent harm to a child and not to
inculcate those values that the State believes will best serve its own, or the
child's, 'best interests.'").
175. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2064 (plurality opinion).
176. For a detailed summary and analysis of these opinions, see The Su-
preme Court 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 229 (2000).
177. In a concurring opinion in Troxel, Justice Thomas noted,
I agree with the plurality that this Court's recognition of a fundamen-
tal right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children resolves
this case.... The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Jus-
tice Souter recognize such a right, but curiously none of them articu-
lates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict scru-
tiny to infringements of fundamental rights.
120 S. Ct. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also William G. Ross, The Con-
temporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights Issues Involv-
ing Education, 34 AKRON L. REv. 177, 185 (2000) (noting that the Court "has
never specifically stated that the right of parents to direct the education of
their children is actually a 'fundamental' right that would trigger strict judi-
cial scrutiny of legislation that affects that right").
178. Compare Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2065 (plurality opinion) ("We... hold
that the application of [the statute] to Granville and her family violated her
due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of her daughters."), with id. at 2065 (Souter, J., concurring) ("The Supreme
Court of Washington invalidated its state statute based on the text of the
statute alone, not its application to any particular case."), and id. at 2068
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court today wisely declines to endorse either
the holding or the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington.... [T]he
State Supreme Court rendered a federal constitutional judgment holding a
state law invalid on its face.").
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teenth Amendment includes parents' fundamental freedom to
"make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children."179 The Court embraced again the commitment
to family integrity, parental authority, and limited government
it had made over fifty years earlier in Prince v. Massachu-
setts: 180 "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nur-
ture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder."181 Indeed, as the Court
famously observed in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,182 it is not just
the "function and freedom" of parents, but also their "right,
coupled with the[ir] high duty, to recognize and prepare" their
children for these obligations. 183 "The child," after all, "is not
the mere creature of the state."84
The Court's consistent defense of the family's substantial,
though certainly not absolute, independence in matters of child
rearing and education is increasingly counter-cultural. 185 Some
regard Pierce as a Lochner-esque anachronism, or perhaps even
as patriarchal propaganda, 186 more than as a principled recog-
nition of parents' educational rights and obligations. Still,
while there is likely some truth in these rival-perhaps "revi-
sionist"'87-accounts, Pierce and Troxel are best read not as a
judicial validation of parental ownership or of dominion over
their children but as reminders of the moral limits on the
claims of the liberal state, the independence of associations,
and the importance of civil society.
188
179. Id. at 2060 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2066 (Souter, J., concur-
ring); id. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring).
180. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
181. Id. at 166. Of course, the Court in Prince rejected the objecting par-
ents' claim. Id. at 170.
182. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
183. Id. at 535.
184. Id.
185. See Carter, supra note 29, at 1194 ("When scholars meet to discuss the
great pantheon of constitutional rights,... we are not much concerned with
the right to direct the upbringing of children; indeed, I suspect that many
scholars disbelieve in it .... ").
186. See James G. Dwyer, Parent's Religion and Children's Welfare: De-
bunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1447 (1994);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1100-06 (1992); cf. MA-
CEDO, supra note 21, at 101.
187. MACEDO, supra note 21, at 99.
188. See generally Garnett, supra note 29.
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In fact, Troxel, like Mitchell, can usefully be read as a case
about expressive association and the expression of associations.
First, Troxel is a freedom-of-expressive-association case in that
it re-affirms the prerogatives of families to constitute them-
selves, and of parents to educate their children, in accord with
their values and beliefs, and thereby to communicate those val-
ues and beliefs to the world, even when they are different from
those preferred by the state. In this respect, Troxel comple-
ments Mitchell. As we have already seen, parents' educational
decisions-about where their children will attend school, who
will be their teachers, with whom they will learn, and so on-
are expressive. Parents are "'speakers' for First Amendment
purposes when they communicate indirectly with their children
through the speech of schools, teachers, home tutors, or other
educational intermediaries."189 Troxel reminds us that the
same can and should be said of child-rearing generally: parents
express themselves-to their children and to the world-when
they instruct, guide, discipline, and communicate with their
children; families express themselves-to their members and to
the world-when they constitute themselves and direct their
activities in accord with certain truths and aspirations.190 As
with other associations, the "formation of [a family] is the crea-
tion of a voice ..."191
Nothing about this point should strike us as particularly
novel. The Court has observed, for example, that "it is through
the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, moral and cultural." 192 In a similar vein, Jus-
tice Souter noted in Troxel that decisions about things so pro-
saic as a child's playmates are, at bottom, decisions about--and
189. Gilles, supra note 145, at 1016.
190. Id. at 1015. Professor Gilles adds,
Consider the daily education of, say, a three-year-old. From reading a
story, to identifying objects and colors, to reiterating the rules against
biting and fighting, to picking out dinner and treats at the grocery
store, to hugs and kisses at bedtime, parental nurturing and educa-
tion pervasively consists of speech and other communicative acts di-
rected toward the child.
Id.; see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 (1977) (noting the important role of the family in "promot[ing] a way
of life' through the instruction of children" (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231 (1971))); Familiaris consortio, supra note 116, 36 ("[The famn-
ily is the first school of those social virtues which every society needs.").
191. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
192. Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
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expression about-the child's "social and moral character."
193
And the Washington Supreme Court recognized that parental
decisions about everything from third-party visitation to Boys
Club football and Saturday morning cartoons are, in the end,
decisions about ideas-ideas that are transmitted to the child
and that are endorsed and expressed to outsiders in those deci-
sions. 19
4
Troxel is consistent and consonant with the themes of this
Essay in confirming that we express ourselves to the world in
the way we constitute and orient our families and by educating
our children in accord with certain goods, that our families me-
diate between persons and the state, and that our families
form, shape, and educate us by their expression and aspira-
tions.195 Adams knew this; he observed on the opening page of
his Education that the path of his education, broadly under-
stood, could not have been more a product of his family "[hlad
he been born in Jerusalem under the shadow of the Temple and
circumcised in the Synagogue by his uncle the high priest."
196
In Troxel, as in Dale and California Democratic Party, the
Court accepts the moral and ideological pluralism that follows
in the wake of expressive association and associations' expres-
sion. Troxel teaches that government may not insist-however
much it might like to-that parents not tell their children that,
say, American militarism is evil, or George W. Bush stole Flor-
ida, or abortion is murder, or Jesus is Lord. 9 7 The state may
193. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2067 (Souter, J., concurring).'
194. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (1998), affd sub nom. Troxel, 120 S. Ct
2054 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting that "parents should be the ones to
choose whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas").
195. See Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 343 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Through the
intimate relationships of the family, our children are nurtured, tutored in the
values and beliefs of our society, and prepared for life."); Gilles, supra note
145, at 941 ("Parents' loving efforts to transmit their values help form their
children's characters, enable them to learn what it is to have a coherent way of
life, and develop their capacity to enter into caring, long-term relationships
with others."). Jean Bethke Elshtain observed recently, in a similar vein, that
"[olne aim of maintaining a robust civil society, beginning with families, is to
forestall concentrations of power at the top. A second aim lies in the recogni-
tion that only many small-scale institutions enable citizens to cultivate democ-
ratic civic habits and to play an active role in civil life." Jean Bethke Elshtain,
Families and Civil Goods, in MARRIAGE AND THE COMMON GOOD 107, 109
(Kenneth Whitehead ed., 2001).
196. EDUCATION, supra note 12, at 3.
197. But see DWYER, supra note 32, at 158 ("[P]arents... might justifiably
be proscribed from expressing sexist views in the presence of children in a way
that damages children's self-esteem.").
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not tell parents who are deciding, say, which friends' influences
are likely to be beneficial, or whether their child is ready for
contact football, or for a PG-13 movie, or for a date with the
class president, or "do what you want, as long as it is what we
want, too." And this is because, when making these and other
decisions, parents are not merely setting rules, they are ex-
pressing and communicating their values to their children, to
the community, and even to the state. 198 By keeping a watchful
eye on the forces and influences that shape a child-for whose
character and conduct society will rightly hold them account-
able-parents are, in a very real sense, speaking and teaching
about what is important. The state may not, in the usual
course of things, co-opt these messages.199
Troxel not only confirms that we speak through our fami-
lies, and that the family is an expressive association, but also
that the family is a mediating and buffering institution, an-
other of the hedgerows that-as we saw in Part II, complicate
the terrain of a well constituted civil society and around which
the state and its own messages must navigate.2°° The family is
a vehicle for expression, but it is also the "first and vital cell of
society."201 Like other expressive associations, it not only me-
198. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 (1977) (noting the important role of the family in "promot[ing] a way
of life through the instruction of children'" (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231 (1971))).
199. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (noting that the
law at issue would "deprive parents of [a] fair opportunity to procure for their
children instruction which they think important and we cannot say is harm-
fil"); cf Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) ("Protection of the association's right to define its membership derives
from the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the
creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that
voice.").
200. See David E. Steinberg, Children and Spiritual Healing: Having Faith
in Free Exercise, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 195 (2000) ('[T]he family,
through the production of numerous diverse citizens, promotes social diversity
and checks factious behavior as expressed through the authority of the majori-
tarian state.'" (quoting David J. Herring, Rearranging the Family: Diversity,
Pluralism, Social Tolerance and Child Custody Disputes, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 205, 215 (1997))); Elshtain, Families and Civil Goods, supra note 191, at
109 ("Families and churches are surely the most important of all [mediating
institutions] for these are our primary character forming institutions."); Tush-
net, supra note 17, at 381 n.9 ("I will treat the family as an institution of civil
society."); id. at 386-91 (discussing the Court's treatment of the family as an
institution of civil society).
201. See Familiaris consortio, supra note 116, 42; see also Jordan v. Jack-
son, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (1994) ("To say that the 'institution of the family is
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diates as it educates, it competes with government for the char-
acter of children and citizens. It is not merely the translator of
the state's preferred messages, it is the state's rival. Troxel-
like Pierce before it-is a reminder that our Constitution ac-
cepts and protects this rivalry, and, as a general matter, nei-
ther authorizes nor permits government to revise, correct, or
censor the associations' expression simply because it prefers a
competing message or its own.20 2 Plato lost;20 3 this is a compe-
tition that, for the most part, the Constitution has determined
parents should win:
The fimdamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize
its children .... The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'... borders on under-
statement. The unitary family is the foundation of society." (quoting Moore v.
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1997))).
202. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2064 (2000) (plurality opin-
ion) ("M[The Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fun-
damental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a
state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made."); id. at 2066-67 (Souter,
J., concurring) ("Meyer's repeatedly recognized right of upbringing would be a
sham if it failed to encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled visita-
tion by 'any party' at 'any time' a judge believed he 'could make a "better" deci-
sion' than the objecting parent had done." (footnote omitted)); see also Hurley
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995) ("Dis-
approval of a private speaker's statement does not legitimize use of the [gov-
ernment's] power to compel the speaker to alter the message by including one
more acceptable to others."). As the Washington Supreme Court observed,
Some parents... will not care if their child is physically disciplined
by a third person; some... will not care if a third person teaches the
child a religion inconsistent with the parents' religion; and some
judges and parents will not care if the child is exposed to or taught
racist or sexist beliefs. But many parents and judges will care, and,
between the two, the parents should be the ones to choose whether to
expose their children to certain people or ideas.
In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (Wash. 1998).
Relatedly, Judge Bork has observed that "in Pierce the state wanted to do
more than ensure that certain subjects and ideas were taught; it wanted to
make sure that other ideas were not taught." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPT-
ING OF AMERICA THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 49 (1990). For this
reason, Judge Bork argued, Pierce could (and, in his view, should) have been
decided as a First Amendment, rather than as a substantive-due-process, case.
Id. at 48-49.
203. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 632 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("Plato offered a vision of a unified society, where the needs of children
are not met by parents but by the government, and where no intermediate
forms of association stand between the individual and the state. The vision is
a brilliant one, but it is not our own. .. ." (citations omitted)).
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the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions.0
CONCLUSION
Starting with Henry Adams's recollections about his "nest
of associations," this Essay opened with a reflection on the na-
ture of education. It observed that education is more than the
delivery of useful information; it is also, for better or worse, the
process of shaping souls. This is, as we saw in Part II, not sur-
prisingly a task which the state would just as soon assign to it-
self. In fact, though, the state competes with the mediating in-
stitutions of civil society, and its expression competes with that
of associations, for the privilege of educating. The freedom of
expressive association, then, is not only the freedom enjoyed by
individuals of expressing themselves through their associa-
tions, but also the freedom of associations to serve and speak as
rival sources of values and loyalties.
Part III then suggested three complementary themes in
the latest expressive-association cases that point toward this
latter form of freedom: acceptance of reasonable pluralism and
of the inevitability of moral disagreement, appropriate judicial
humility in the face of such disagreement, and recognition of, if
not appreciation for, the integrity, independence, and expres-
sion of mediating associations. Finally, Part IV used these
themes as a bridge to the Court's decisions in Mitchell and
Troxel, and approached these latter cases with an eye toward
the function and importance of associations' expression, as well
as expressive association, in achieving the values toward which
these themes point. This Part's-and this Essay's-modest
suggestion is that we supplement our view of the freedom of as-
sociation, and of associations generally, as means of individual
self-expression with an appreciation for the mediating and edu-
cating function of associations themselves.
Education is the process and vocation of shaping souls.
Now more than ever, though, the shape our souls ought to take,
and the ends toward which they ought to be directed, are con-
tested matters. Education is, therefore, in many ways a contest
that the liberal state, no less than any other, wants to win and
is invariably tempted to "fix." But associations and their ex-
pression get in the way.
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In its recent decisions, the Court has beat back efforts by
government to control the terms of our debates by editing or co-
opting our expression as it passes through associations. We
ought also to be on guard-and it appears that the present
Court is appropriately wary-against the state's efforts to si-
lence the potentially subversive expression of its educational
rivals, and thereby to control the debate by standardizing the
debaters.
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